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Abstract 
Acquisitions of new businesses and divestments of existing ones are frequently 
components of large organizations‟ corporate strategies. In both acquisitions and 
divestments, corporate IT infrastructure plays a critical role for realizing business 
objectives. In this paper, we take a dual view of the IT-related challenges in divestment 
and acquisition strategies, studying them as a single integrated transaction between a 
buyer and a seller and investigating how the IT carve-out and IT integration strategies 
influence each other. The extant literature on the interaction between carve-outs and 
integration strategies is an empty set. Here, we begin to shed light to the limitations of 
the carve-out contract, the processes of carving out a business unit from one and 
integrating it into another multi-business organization, asymmetries in both parties‟ 
preferences for an IT transaction process and its influence on arising challenges and 
organization performance. 
Keywords:  Divestment, IT Carve-Out, Acquisition, IT Integration, Strategy, Alignment 
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Introduction 
Acquisitions of new businesses and divestments of existing ones are frequently components of major 
organizations’ corporate strategies. Acquisitions enable growth in complimentary business domains, 
creating synergies for both the acquirer and target. Divestments enable the vendor to focus on profitable 
core business units, freeing up financial resources for investment (Decker and Mellewigt 2007).  
In acquisitions and divestments, solutions to IT challenges are critical for realizing the potential value of 
the transaction. As most organizations are dependent on IT to carry out their business activities, they 
cannot function effectively post-acquisition until the IT of the acquired business unit is integrated into the 
acquirer’s IT infrastructure (Evgeniou 2002; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). The exception is when the 
acquisition is a financial or portfolio investment that is not to be integrated into the acquirer’s 
organization. The counterpart to IT integration is the IT carve-out process, referring to the activities 
needed to separate two organizations (see page 4). Henceforth, we refer to the combined IT carve-out and 
integration activities as an IT transaction, emphasizing that the carve-out and integration processes can 
be regarded as the same process, seen from the vendor’s and buyer’s perspectives. 
The extant literature on both IT integration in acquisitions and IT carve-out processes is limited. In 
addition, there is, to the authors’ knowledge, no literature on their combined processes. Until today, this 
process has been studied from either a vendor’s (Böhm et al. 2010; Buchta et al. 2010; Du and Tanriverdi 
2010; Leimeister et al. 2008) or a buyer’s perspective (Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Johnston and Yetton 1996; 
Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Tanriverdi and Uysal 2011; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). 
However, the extant literature does report some initial findings identifying interdependencies between 
the two processes. For example, Böhm et al. (2010) point out that the IT carve-out process is contingent 
on the nature of the buyer. Whether the business unit is to become a stand-alone business, acquired by a 
private equity fund, for example, or integrated into another multi-business organization is critical for the 
design of the carve-out process. Similarly Henningsson and Carlsson (2011) observe that the IT 
integration process is contingent on the acquisition target’s pre-acquisition status, as a stand-alone 
business unit or fully integrated strategic business unit in a multi-business organization.  
Given this initial evidence that the IT carve-out strategy and the IT integration strategy are dependent on 
the decisions and actions of the transaction counterparty, this exploratory study begins to shed light on 
how the relationship between decisions about the IT carve-out and IT integration contribute to value 
creation in organizational transactions. The question guiding this exploratory research is: 
 How do the IT carve-out and IT integration strategies in organizational 
transactions influence each other? 
The general research on acquisitions and divestments describe the relationship between the two parties in 
the carve-out and integration as characterized by the presence of both competition and cooperation (see, 
for example, Dalziel 2008; Graebner et al. 2010; Lajoux 2006). Their joint effect is frequently referred to 
as co-opetition (Walley 2007). It is cooperative because there is a mutual interest in the organizational 
transaction. This is manifested by the organizations collaborating to successfully deliver an efficient IT 
transaction. On the other hand, the vendor and the buyer compete to defend their own specific interests.  
Different situations motivate collaborative and competitive behavior. For example, including a production 
system specific to the divested business unit could increase the value for the acquirer and, hence, would 
justify a higher price for the vendor. Conversely, the vendor wants to discontinue its IT platform’s support 
of the divested unit at the earliest opportunity, whereas the acquirer wants the maximum flexibility, while 
it prepares to migrate the new business unit onto its own IT platform.  
As this example shows, both parties need to be aware of their competitive and cooperative objectives. As 
the path dependency literature highlights, decisions tend to persist over time, shaping and constraining 
future options (Ghemawat 1991; Porter 1991). Therefore, the buyer’s integration strategy options are 
contingent on the seller’s carve-out strategy. It follows that transaction success can be improved by 
negotiating the carve-out and integration strategies to align the activities. Misaligned activities increase 
transaction complexity and resource commitment. To foster the identification and negotiation of 
alignment between seller and buyer, an analytical framework is required.  
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To develop this framework, we begin by reviewing the extant literature on IT carve-out and integration 
strategies in divestments and acquisitions. Based on this review, we identify the interdependencies 
between the carve-out and integration strategies. We then describe our research methodology, a case 
study of carve-out and integration strategies in an organizational transaction, and the inter-dependences 
of those strategies from the perspectives of the vendor and buyer. Finally, we review the findings, evaluate 
their limitations and discuss their implications for theory and practice. 
Related literature and theoretical development 
The domain of mergers, acquisitions and divestments is large and complex. Here, we restrict the analysis 
to the transfer of strategic business units from one multi-business organization to another. The IT 
transaction, the combined carve-out and integration process, involves a set of strategic actions in which 
business resources and capabilities are transferred from one organization to another (Sudarsanam 2003). 
Value is created by increasing the degree of complimentary of the resources and capabilities of the 
acquired business unit with the resources and capabilities of the acquirer, while reducing the cost to the 
divesting organization (Capron et al. 1998). In the carve-out, IT capabilities are disconnected and 
detached from the divesting organization. In the acquisition, IT capabilities are merged, reinvented and 
reused to support the acquired business unit. 
We begin by briefly describing the role and use of IT in multi-business organizations. Specifically, we 
describe the IT alignment model of Reynolds et al. (2010) that was developed specifically for multi-
business organizations. This is adopted as our point of departure to develop an analytical frame to 
integrate IT carve out and integration strategies. The Reynolds et al. model has been used to explain the 
divestment of strategic business units (SBUs) from the vendor’s perception (Böhm et al. 2010; Fähling et 
al. 2010; Fähling et al. 2009) and integration by the acquirer (Henningsson and Yetton 2011) However, it 
has not been applied to the challenge how the two strategies influence each other.  
Alignment in multi-business organizations 
Multi-business organizations, the dominant form for large organizations, involve multiple strategic 
business units (SBUs), each of which competes in its own market. Also referred to as multi-divisional or 
M-Form organizations, superior performance in these organizations is achieved by establishing a number 
of semi-independent SBUs that allow the organizations to grow and diversify (Chandler 1962; Williamson 
1975). In these organizations, strategies are formed at both the corporate and business unit levels (Grant 
2002). Corporate strategy specifies how to compete as an organization. This includes the choice of 
markets in which to compete, the level of sharing of resources across the organization by the SBUs, and 
the acquisition and divestiture of business units. Strategies at the SBU level specify how to compete in 
each of those markets (Grant 2005).  
Managing multi-business organizations requires that their corporate strategies generate and capture 
synergies by sharing resources across the SBUs. Otherwise, corporate performance would be simply the 
sum of the individual SBU performances (Dosi et al. 1992; Teece and Pisano 1994). Nevertheless, the 
extant models of business and IT alignment (see, for example, Henderson and Venkatraman 1993) do not 
distinguish between corporate and SBU business strategies to align these business strategies with the 
relevant IT strategies.  
Reynolds et al. (2010) extend those models to include the differences between corporate and SBU level 
business strategies, and their integration with IT strategies at the corporate and SBU levels, respectively. 
The result is the two-dimensional framework presented in Figure 1, identifying four alignment 
components (Corporate strategy, SBU strategy, Corporate IT platform, and SBU IT application portfolios) 
along the two dimensions of functional (Business vs. IT) and organizational (Corporate vs. SBU level) 
alignment.  
The Reynolds et al. (2010) model draws on the resource based-view of strategy (see, for example, Peteraf 
1993). Value is created by building IT-based capabilities that complement business capabilities at both the 
corporate and SBU levels. As shown in Figure 1, organizational alignment requires complementarity 
between business and IT capabilities at the corporate and SBU levels, coherence between the corporate 
and SBU strategies, and fit between the IT platform and individual SBU IT portfolio capabilities, while 
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maximizing the independence across SBU IT capabilities. The IT platform capabilities support corporate 
business strategies and SBU IT portfolios capabilities, and the SBU IT portfolio capabilities support their 
corresponding SBU strategies and leverage the IT platform capabilities.  
 
IT Carve-out strategies 
Within the domain of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), the term divestment refers to the separation of 
an organization into two or more stand alone assets (Cascorbi 2003). According to Cascorbi, the major 
characteristic of a demerger is the disintegration of an organization, where the term disintegration 
functions as a generic term that covers all legal, business, process and organizational related activities of a 
demerger. Disintegration can be considered as the counterpart of the term integration during an M&A 
transaction. The term divestiture is often used interchangeably for divestment. In some cases, the term 
carve-out is also defined to include financial and legal aspects of a demerger (see, for example, Michaely 
and Shaw (1995) and Taub (2006)). 
Instead of the above financially oriented definition, Broyd and Storch (2006) and Buchta et al. (2010) 
define a carve-out as the operational activities needed to conduct a demerger, in which the carve-out 
object is established either as a stand-alone organization or merged with another organization. A carve-
out typically includes the actions required to de-integrate the IT systems of the carve-out object from its 
parent organization. Similarly, Leimeister et al. (2008) define the IT carve-out process to include the 
separation of all shared information and communication technology related activities. 
In this paper, we draw from both the financial and operational M&A literatures. Demerger is used as a 
general term for the overall process of separating a business unit from its parent organization. Divestment 
or divestiture refers to the financial or corporate strategic aspects of a demerger. Carve-out covers all 
operational activities needed to implement a demerger. Finally, the term IT carve-out refers to the 
activities needed to separate a carve-out object’s IT assets from its parent. 
Typically, the carve-out process can be organized into 4 phases (Fähling et al. 2010; Leimeister et al. 
2008). These begin with ‘preSigning’ and ‘preClosing’, which occur before the carve-out object is handed 
over to the new owner, and the subsequent phases of ‘Transition’ and ‘postCutting’ (see Fgure 2). The 
preSigning phase includes all preparations before a legally binding contract is finalized. The critical 
activity in this phase is the due diligence process. This is an audit in which the prospective buyers get 
 
Figure 1. IT Alignment in Multi-business Organizations (Reynolds et al., 2010)  
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access to interviewees and a data room to assess the target company (DePamphilis 2009). The data room 
is a physical or online document repository, which contains selected information made available to 
prospective buyers. 
The separation of the carve-out object starts with the signing milestone. It may start earlier, if the seller is 
confident that the carve-out will be completed. In the preClosing phase, all separation tasks should be 
completed before Day One. At that time, the carve-out object becomes a legally independent entity, the 
property of the acquirer. This is, therefore, the most disruptive change to its pre-separation parent’s 
operations. Typically, it is only possible to separate the most critical IT systems before this date (Buchta et 
al. 2010). Leimeister et al. (2008) distinguish between logical, step-wise and physical separation. Step-
wise separation describes a gradual process that initially uses logical separation on the same hardware 
and is later completed by a complete physical separation. For the carve-out object’s network, this process 
begins with establishing a carve-out firewall as the first level of logical separation. 
 
Transition is the longest phase during which most of the separation work takes place. With increasing 
time after Day One, the dependency of the carve-out object on its parent organization is reduced. Until 
full physical separation is achieved, transitional service agreements (TSAs) are used to ensure and control 
the service provision by the parent organization to the carve-out object. For example, after Day One, the 
parent organization could act as service provider for the wide area network connections. It is important to 
note that in comparison to full physical separation, TSAs are a suboptimal, temporary solution (Coury et 
al. 2009; Du and Tanriverdi 2010).  
TSAs simply allow the involved parties to delay the physical full separation. Where possible, these 
agreements are avoided because they constrain the strategic flexibility of both parties and the costs can be 
substantial (Buchta et al. 2010). Finally, with the cutting milestone, the carve-out object ceases to have 
any relationship with its former parent. Therefore, the overall success of an IT carve-out can be assessed 
by the achievement of the project’s specific objectives and the degree of separation obtained at the Cutting 
milestone. As a full separation of the IT Systems, in contrast to the other carve-out work streams, can 
often not be achieved until Cutting, TSAs and the final separation activities are frequently continued in 
the postCutting phase. 
Figure 1 above presents the Reynolds et al. (2010) analytical frame adopted here to research the IT 
transaction. In Figure 3, Reynolds et al.’s (2010) model is adapted to show the line of separation between 
the seller and the buyer. On the left hand side, Figure 3 shows the disentanglement of the SBU’s strategy 
from its corporate parent’s strategy. The focus of this paper is on the right hand side of the model, the 
separation of the SBU IT Portfolio from the services provided by the SBU’s parent’s corporate IT platform. 
As described in the next section, these links are replaced with links to its new parent during the 
integration project.  
From an alignment perspective, the fit between business and IT capabilities of the carve-out object should 
remain high throughout the transaction process, unless the transaction leads to a significant change in the 
SBU’s business strategy.  The coherence between corporate and SBU capabilities on the other side 
becomes irrelevant during the carve-out process, as the links to the former parent are cut. However, this is 
an important issue during the integration phase, when coherence has to be established with the new 
parent (see below), because the coherence between the former corporate and SBU capabilities might have 
an influence on the challenges that arise during the cutting process, as capabilities (i.e. information 
systems or IT knowledge) formerly sourced from the parent’s corporate IT platform need to be identified 
and replaced. In addition, the independence between SBU capabilities in the former parent has an 
 
Figure 2. The carve-out process (Fähling et al. 2010)  
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influence on the challenges arising in the carve-out process. Highly dependent capabilities at the SBU 
level (e.g. the carve-out object provides information systems for another SBU) increases the complexity of 
the carve-out as dependencies have to be identified and new capabilities have to be developed within the 
former parent organization (Böhm et al. 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3. The carve-out of a business unit depicted in the alignment of Reynolds et al. (2010)  
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interest for the seller. Otherwise, the buyer might be able to access sensitive data within the network of 
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 Physical separation: Following the logical separation, the IT infrastructure is physically separated. The 
applications run on separate physical machines and in physically separate networks. 
 Stepwise separation: This approach is often applied due to ambitious schedules for the Closing and a 
very short timeframe between the announcement release and the Closing milestone. In this case, the 
logical separation is used as an interim solution for the provision of hardware. 
The major distinction is between logical and physical separation. Physical separation refers to a clean cut 
on a hardware level, meaning that all information systems required by carve-out object run on physically 
separated machines. This includes applications as well as data. The network connecting the machines is 
also physically separate from the network of the former parent. In contrast, logical separation only 
virtually encapsulates data, applications, or infrastructure. Physically they remain on the same hardware. 
Logical separation can be achieved by creating separate instances of an application, virtual machines or 
firewalls separating networks. 
IT integration strategies 
While the IT-based literature on acquisitions is limited, the evidence strongly supports the general 
conclusion that IT integration post-acquisition is necessary to capture the anticipated IT-based benefits 
(Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Johnston and Yetton 1996; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Wijnhoven et al. 2006), 
unless the acquisition is a financial or portfolio investment that is not to be integrated into the acquirer’s 
organization. Johnston and Yetton (1996) analyze this issue at the technical, IT function and 
organizational levels. Giacomazzi et al. (1997) identify factors that influence IT integration success and 
propose a normative model for IT alignment employing the three categories of full, partial and no 
integration. Wijnhoven et al. (2006) combine those three categories with four types of integration modes 
to develop a variant on Henderson and Venkatraman’s (1993) Strategic Alignment Model. Mehta and 
Hirschheim adopt the IT alignment framework of Hirschheim and Sabherwal (2001) to and identify 
factors such as acquirer-target power struggles, prior merger experience, and overarching synergy goals, 
that shape IS integration decisions in a merger context. 
Taken together, the extant literature highlights the importance of IT integration in acquisitions. The 
acquiring organizations need to align business and IT strategies at both corporate and SBU levels post-
acquisition to realize the potential benefits from the acquisition (Reynolds et al., 2010). The IT integration 
strategy is the route to establish IT capabilities that match the needs of both the acquired business unit 
and its new parent (Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Johnston and Yetton 1996; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). The 
appropriate IT integration strategy is contingent on pre-acquisition IT capabilities in the acquirer and 
target business unit, and the expected benefits from the acquisition (Wijnhoven et al., 2006; Mehta and 
Hirschheim, 2007; Johnston and Yetton, 1996; Giacomazzi et al., 1997; Henningsson and Yetton, 2011). 
The acquisition literature outlines three basic business integration strategies for consolidating resources 
and capabilities (Capron et al. 1998; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Sudarsanam 2003):  
 Absorption: The target unit is absorbed by the acquirer. The business benefits are contingent on 
resource rationalization by redeploying resources from the acquirer. The absorption strategy requires 
full incorporation of both business activities and supporting functions. 
 Symbiosis: This strategy seeks to combine the strengths of both parties in the consolidation. Essentially, 
it is a best of breed approach. For example, complimentary capabilities to support sales across 
geographical markets in the acquired unit are employed in the acquirer to support a general 
geographical market business strategy. Alternatively, the combined organization provides a one-stop 
shop for the combined customer base. In this approach, the strategic processes specific to the 
acquisition and the acquirer are retained, while the replicated processes are merged.  
 Preservation: The target business unit is left to act independently, at least, from an operational 
perspective. Financial resources, managerial capabilities or specific knowledge might be introduced to 
develop the target, but business processes in the acquisition and the acquirer are not integrated.  
Each of the three business integration strategies are complemented by different IT integration capabilities 
and objectives (Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). The absorption strategy corresponds to a 
complete IT integration objective, where the acquisition’s business capabilities are supported by the 
acquirer’s IT capabilities. Symbiosis acquisitions are matched by partial IT integration, in which IT 
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capabilities supporting the replicated and, therefore, redundant processes are integrated, and IT 
capabilities unique to the acquisition and the acquirer are retained as independent capabilities. 
Preservation acquisitions are matched by a co-existence IT integration strategy, in which IT integration is 
limited to the minimum integration needed to satisfy accounting and regulatory requirements.  
Figure 4 illustrates the integration process within our analytical framework, assuming that the new parent 
is aligned (blue arrows). Co-existence strategy is simple to achieve by replacing the corporate level 
capabilities provided by the former parent. The simplest way to achieve this is to duplicate the former 
parent’s information systems. Links to the new parent would be establishes where necessary, such as for 
accounting and financial controlling (this would result in weak links represented by the green lines in 
Figure 4). This strategy tends to create misaligned organizations, as the coherence between the acquirer’s 
corporate capabilities and the capabilities of the new SBU is typically low. 
Following a partial or complete IT integration strategy, a major challenge is to establish coherence 
between corporate and SBU capabilities (green lines in figure 4) in order to achieve a well aligned 
organization post-acquisition. From an IT perspective, this is because it is likely that the IT capabilities to 
be merged are located at both corporate and SBU levels. Hence, independence between SBU capabilities 
has to be established first by decomposing the acquired organization’s IT capabilities into platform 
capabilities and SBU specific IT capabilities. Following Reynolds et al.’s (2010) alignment model, shared 
capabilities should be provided by the new parents IT platform and only SBU-specific IT capabilities 
should remain at the new SBU. 
Unless the acquisition implies a significant shift of the carve-out object’s business strategy or the new 
corporate IT platform lacks major capabilities, the fit between business and IT capabilities at the new SBU 
remains high if the acquirer was aligned pre-acquisition.  
 
 
Figure 4. The integration of a business unit depicted in the alignment of Reynolds et al. (2010)  
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independent, viable unit that can then be integrated into the buyer’s organization (Broyd and Storch 
2006; Buchta et al. 2010; Müller 2006). For the buyer, this involves a post acquisition integration project 
to realize synergies from integrating the business unit into its new parent organization.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Perspectives of transactions 
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Figure 6.  Analytical framework for influence between IT carve out and integration strategies 
 
Figure 6 highlights, the need to realign the carve-out object in order to integrate it into the buyer. 
Formerly the carve-out object has been aligned to the seller’s corporate strategy and corporate IT 
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integrating the carve-out object into its own IT platform, restricting its flexibility and leaving it with the 
current operational costs. Thus, it inhibits the options to co-create value by leveraging synergies or 
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including other IT benefits. On the other hand, the buyer gains time to build a new and optimized IT 
platform.  
In contrast, physical separation provides the option for all three integration strategies as the buyer has full 
control over the systems. Figure 7 summarizes this and illustrates how specific carve-out strategies 
influence subsequent integration strategies. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Matching IT Carve-Out and IT Integration Strategies 
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Formally, we propose: 
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Case Study: The MD SBU carve-out and integration  
Research Methodology 
We conducted a single critical case study of the divestment of the Mobile Device SBU (MD SBU) from 
OldTech to MuXi. The unit of analysis is the combined IT carve-out and integration project. IT integration 
in the context of acquisitions and IT carve-outs is a novel areas of research. Therefore, case study research 
is an appropriate methodology to develop and test new theory (Yin 2009). The theoretical frameworks 
discussed above provide a rich analytical framework to guide our research. The contemporary status of 
the events researched here also supports the use of a case-based research methodology (Yin 2009). To 
guide our research process, we follow Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Yin’s (2009) suggestions for conducting 
case study research. For the data analysis, we draw on Mayring (2008). 
The case was chosen, based on its theoretical richness (Eisenhardt 1989), because it highlights how the 
competing objectives of the seller and the buyer both influence the IT transaction process and the 
conflicts arising in the buyer-seller-relationship. Another rationale for choosing this case was its criticality 
(Yin 2009), highlighting the detrimental effects of incompatible transaction objectives and the resulting 
misalignment of IT carve-out and integration strategies. Therefore, case study research is especially useful 
to study the underlying rationales and their effects, for which the chosen case provides rich insights and 
represents an ‘unsuccessful’ example. 
The data collection relied on the triangulation of five semi-structured interviews, complemented by three 
more general interviews, with documents and public sources. The Interviewees had extensive knowledge 
of the transaction, typically holding a leadership position. Two interviewees were part of the carve-out 
project on the seller’s side. Two interviewees worked for the carve-out object and switched to the buyer 
during the transaction. Another interviewee was from the buyer side. Three additional interviews were 
conducted with people being involved in the seller’s carve-out project. However, these interviews did not 
solely focus on the case presented in this paper. These interviewees shared their impressions and lessons 
learned about the carve-out and integration. Besides internal project members, we also interviewed 
consultants participating in the project, to also obtain an external and more neutral perspective. Put 
together, the interviews resemble all important perspectives of the carve-out and integration project. 
Table 2 summarizes the interviews and secondary sources. Five interviews were conducted on-site. At the 
interviewee’s request, three were conducted by telephone. 
Table 2. Summary of Interviews and Secondary Sources 
Source Role / Type Perspective Length 
Interview 1 Project Manager: Infrastructure Carve-Out Seller 31 minutes 
Interview 2 Project Manager: Infrastructure Integration Buyer 45 minutes 
Interview 3 CIO of Carve-Out Object Carve-Out Object 35 minutes 
Interview 4 Consultant (Partner,PM): IT Workstream Carve-Out Seller 37 minutes 
Interview 5 Consultant (Manager): IT Carve-Out & Integration Carve-Out Object 47 minutes 
Interview 6* Regional Coordinator IT Workstream Seller 50 minutes 
Interview 7* 3 Consultants Seller 98 minutes 
Interview 8* Head of Labor Relations Seller 80 minutes 
Document 1 Master project plan Seller 12 pages 
Document 2 Collection of various press releases Seller & Buyer 43 pages 
Document 3 European Comission: Regulation report Seller & Buyer 6 pages 
 
* these interviews did not exclusively focus on the case 
 
The data was analyzed using a category coded content analysis technique (Mayring 2008). The coding 
categories were derived from the analytical framework. Coding categories included, for example, ‘buyer-
seller relationship’, ‘business IT alignment’, ‘transaction objective’, ‘carve-out strategy’ and ‘integration 
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strategy’. Additional categories were used for events in the transaction, challenges or reflections about the 
success of the project. The unit of analysis was defined, with reference to Mayring (2008), as a statement 
of the interviewees that contained impressions, experiences or judgments related to the coding categories. 
Based on the literature review, the findings of the coding process were related to the theoretical concepts 
that underpin each category. 
To guarantee a high quality of our research design, we followed Yin’s (2009) case study tactics to ensure 
construct, internal and external validity as well as reliability. Our measures included the triangulation of 
multiple sources of evidence by interviewing people from all three stakeholders as well as internal and 
external project members. Additionally we included internal and public documentation (see table 2). 
Important and ambiguous explanations have been discussed in the researcher team and cross-checked 
with other sources of evidence. For data analysis and archival purposes, interviews have been recorded, 
transcribed and coded using Atlas.TI. Eventually we reflected our empirical findings in theory. 
Case Background 
The OldTech Group is a European-based global organization. It operates in more than 170 countries with 
over 100,000 employees, generating €70 billion in revenues. Its business is divided into more than 10 
divisions, including, for example, communications, IT service provision, automation technology and 
medical solutions. 
In 2004, several business units were merged into the communications division, creating one of the 
world’s largest suppliers of telecommunications equipment and services. The product offerings and 
services ranged from network infrastructure, cordless and mobile devices, and services to integrated 
communications solutions. In 2005, the communications business revenue was more than €10 billion. 
However, the consumer mobile devices division generated a loss of more than €1 million per day. 
Although OldTech had played a major role in the research and development of, and the market creation 
for mobile phones, its success was concentrated in a few geographical regions. Despite efforts to enter 
other markets, including the US, the products were seen to be less innovative and trendy than the devices 
from competitors from Asia. 
To focus on its core competencies, OldTech began in 2005 to restructure the communication division, 
beginning with the divestiture of the consumer mobile device business. The business unit was sold to 
MuXi, an emerging Asian-based competitor. As a contract manufacturer for other mobile phone 
manufactures, MuXi’s strategic intent behind the acquisition was to capture increased economies of scale 
and access to technology and production know how. 
Integrated Case Analysis: The IT Transaction Process 
Prior to the divestiture, OldTech had merged several business units into its communications division 
seeking to realize synergies. They had also integrated the information systems into the parent’s shared 
services center. This is consistent with Reynolds et al.’s (2010) alignment model of having a corporate IT 
platform that leverages the SBUs IT portfolio. With this move into shared services, the people and with 
them the skills to operate and maintain the systems moved to the shared services provider.  
Given their experience of success from prior IT carve-outs, OldTech had adopted a stepwise separation 
strategy (Leimeister et al., 2008). Beginning with kick-off meetings in May 2005 to provide initial 
briefings for the involved people, logical application separation had been launched before the formal 
signing of the contract with MuXi. According to the carve-out manager, this was necessary to meet the 
legal requirements for fiscal and legal relevant IT to be physically separated by the closing milestone. 
According to the carve-out strategy, the logically separated applications would run on a logically separated 
infrastructure provided by OldTech’s shared services provider and be billed as an outsourcing contract to 
MuXi. The rationale behind this strategy was to keep the costs of the carve-out as low as possible. 
The contract between OldTech and MuXi regarding the acquisition of MD SBU was signed in June 2005. 
The closing milestone and with it, the legal and economic transfer of ownership, was set for October 2005.  
Importantly, information technology aspects were not treated as critical issues and specified formally in 
the acquisition contract. This left open the question of the IT carve-out and IT integration strategies.  
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“For the alignment between [OldTech] and [MuXi] only the most basic issues were subject 
to negotiation. These included, for example, the time frame, how to deal with services after 
the carve-out and SLAs. At the project level, there was no evidence that [MuXi] was 
involved in the design of the guidelines for the carve-out.” (Int4, p. 67, IT Carve-Out Project 
Manager) 
The managers responsible for the IT carve-out and IT integration work streams for the two parties met for 
the first time in July to discuss the IT transaction strategy. This did not result in aligned IT carve-out and 
IT integration strategies. Consistent with MuXi’s strategic intent to increase economies of scale, its major 
objective for the IT integration was to cut costs. They didn’t agree with OldTech in running a stepwise 
separation strategy that would require MuXi to rely on OldTech’s shared services provider as their 
outsource provider.  
Instead, MuXi wanted to operate the systems. However, as OldTech’s major objective was to get rid of the 
loss generating MD SBU, it did not want to do anything that would potentially increase their costs of the 
IT carve-out project. The project escalated. The responsible IT managers, including the CIO of MuXi, met 
for a two week intensive workshop. This did not resolve the issue. 
“It took [OldTech] quite a long time to understand that we would not sign any of these 
[outsourcing] contracts.” (Int02, p. 125, Integration Project Manager) 
“One would have had to design the carve-out differently. Together with the partner who 
receives [MD SBU]. Basically [OldTech] conducted a stand-alone carve-out, they had their 
plan, defined packages to handover, and [the outsourcing provider] assigned prices to them 
and said we would operate them for you. [MuXi] had a look on it and said „you are crazy‟. 
We want to operate it our selves‟. [OldTech] replied that they couldn‟t give them the 
hardware and that they couldn‟t provide this and that. Basically, we had to start 
integration again. Twice the effort” (Int2, p. 113, Integration Project Manager) 
The major challenges resulting from the failure to align the carve-out and integration strategies were: 
 Conflicting objectives which influenced the IT transaction process, raising the transaction costs and, 
effectively, lead to a second carve-out for MuXi: 
„OldTech moved the systems from one OldTech hardware to a second OldTech hardware. 
We basically moved from there to our own hardware. (Int2, p. 121, Integration Project 
Manager) 
 A lack of competencies due to the initial outsourcing setup: 
„OldTech‟s outsourcing stratgey [in 2004] meant that IT staff has relocated to the shared 
services provider. Only business people, controllers, purchasers and project managers 
remained at the [MD SBU]. MuXi‟s strategy shift towards self-operation meant that the 
right team [of technically skilled people] wasn‟t on board [of the MD SBU].“ (Int2, p. 53-65, 
Integration Project Manager) 
  A lack of transparency: 
“Responsibilities were not clarified. The communication between both parties [OldTech and 
MuXi] didn‟t work very well. […] Therefore, problems arose […]. It was not clear, who was 
doing what.“ (Int3, p. 201, Regional IT Manager MD SBU) 
Despite severe challenges and the significant additional costs imposed by the misalignment of seller and 
buyer objectives, the IT transaction was considered as a success by both the IT carve-out and IT 
integration managers. This might appear contradictory regarding the higher goal of an integrated IT 
transaction, as discussed in this paper. Nonetheless, seen as a single project of each IT work stream 
project manager, it can be understood in terms of meeting their individual objectives. For OldTech’s IT 
workstream this was carving MD SBU without significant cost involvement within reasonable time. For 
MuXi it was to eventually completely integrating MD SBU, achieving lower operational IT costs.  
Nevertheless, judged as an integrated transaction project, from carve-out to integration, the project was 
suboptimal. For both parties the transaction incurred higher resource commitment as unsettled 
responsibilities lead to redundant work and various project escalations required time and top 
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management involvement. For MuXi it was suboptimal as they had to commit additional resources to 
conduct the ‘second carve-out’. This left them with higher costs and lower flexibility to immediately start 
off with their intended IT platform strategy. Besides higher resource commitment, OldTech suffered from 
a bad public reputation as well from various legal claims. This included for example the violation of 
Transitional Service Agreements (TSAs). 
As a result of this suboptimal transaction OldTech has further evolved its carve-out practice. Their key 
learnings were to involve IT responsibles earlier in negotiations and to be careful about long term 
engagements e.g. with TSAs. This also led to a blacklist of issues that should be strictly avoided in future 
carve-outs and thus not be offered during negotiations. 
Discussion 
Explaining buyer-seller relationship and emerging challenges 
Figure 6 provides a framework within which to analyze both organizations corporate strategies, their 
influence on the existing IT landscape and their objective for the carve-out or integration project, 
respectively. Hence it helps to identify the critical links between corporate and IT strategy as well as the 
resulting conflicts from competitive objectives and misaligned activities. 
OldTech was a large, diversified industry conglomerate. Part of its corporate strategy was to acquire and 
divest business units on a regular base. Prior to the divestiture of MD SBU, OldTech had restructured its 
communications division. This restructure had led to a shared services center and a centralized IT 
infrastructure for the business units in that division. However, with OldTech being a large industry 
conglomerate, the range of shared services was large and the IT components in the infrastructure were 
strongly interdependent. Only specific IT components, such as software development environments for 
devices, were operated by the individual SBUs. This is consistent with Reynolds et al.’s (2010) 
propositions described in the analytical framework.  
Continuing the restructuring project, OldTech’s corporate strategy was to divest the loss-generating MD 
SBU. The objective was, naturally, to get rid of this business without committing more money than 
necessary to the IT carve-out project. Consequently, OldTech had adopted a stepwise separation strategy 
to meet the tight transaction schedule and to minimize its IT carve-out costs. As a consequence, they had 
logically separated all former shared services of the MD SBU and prepared a plan to have it operated by 
OldTech’s shared services provider. The shared services were later ported to a physically separate 
infrastructure that mirrored the initial logical separation. 
MuXi’s corporate strategy on the other hand was focused on cost leadership and economies of scale. 
Capturing increased economies of scale was the primary reason that MuXi acquired MD SBU. This 
translated into a sleek, self operated corporate IT platform. Hence, their IT transaction objective was to 
maintain this cost-efficient IT environment by absorbing MD SBU’s IT infrastructure following a 
complete IT integration strategy. 
The two organizations’ corporate IT platforms were significantly different, leveraging their specific 
corporate strategies. Therefore, the absorption of MD SBU’s IT infrastructure by simply replacing the 
corporate IT platform did not work. In order to immediately align MD SBU’s IT portfolio with MuXi’s 
corporate IT platform major revisions would have been required during the transaction process. However, 
as both parties had very competitive objectives for the transaction, they did not align their transaction 
strategy. As a result the IT transaction was unsuccessful judged from the perspective of an integrated IT 
transaction approach. OldTech simply stuck to its proven carve-out strategy, which was also in line with 
its corporate strategy. However additional resource commitment was required as MuXi would not agree 
with this approach. MuXi eventually began their integration project when the IT carve-out of MD SBU 
from OldTech has been completed.  
For OldTech, the optimal situation would have been a carve-out process that ended in a stand-alone SBU 
without involving the buyer. OldTech’s preferred carve-out strategy would have matched a preservation IT 
integration strategy by the buyer. Everything else complicated matters for OldTech. In order to keep their 
transaction costs low, they did not want to align their carve-out strategy with the buyer’s integration 
strategy. On the other hand, the acquirer’s preferred integration strategy was absorption to fully integrate 
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the acquired business unit into their corporate IT platform and align it to their corporate strategic 
objectives. As both parties’ corporate IT platforms would not match, a realignment of the carve-out 
objects IT portfolio would have been required for an optimal transaction. However, as OldTech did not 
intend to get involved in the integration project, they continued their stepwise separation strategy and 
eventually provided a physically separated IT environment, temporarily operated by their shared services 
center. This gave MuXi the time to subsequently pursue its absorption strategy, porting the IT 
infrastructure into their IT platform. For MuXi and the overall objective of an integrated IT transaction 
process, this was a suboptimal compromise since it basically resembled the spin-off type of a divestment. 
As described earlier, this means that the carve-out project is completely separated from any future 
integration project by establishing a stand-alone company first. 
Our discussion shows that the analytical framework presented in this paper (figure 6) is a versatile tool to 
study challenges arising in combined transactions, integrating vendor and buyer perspectives. In the 
presented case it was obvious that both parties’ corporate IT platforms were significantly different as they 
supported different corporate strategies. As the carve-out objects IT has been aligned for a very different 
corporate IT platform, major integration efforts were required to realign the SBU portfolio to the 
acquirer’s corporate IT platform. However, competing objectives which were not settled and negotiated in 
the pre-signing phase inhibited the alignment of both parties’ transaction strategies. 
The case presented above also supports our first proposition that IT Integration strategies are contingent 
on IT carve-out strategies. MuXi has not been able to immediately integrate MD SBU’s IT portfolio into 
their corporate IT platform as it was still under control of OldTech, following a logical separation strategy. 
Thus, MuXi had to remain with a co-existence strategy until physical separation was achieved in the 
‘second carve-out’. From then on, MuXi could follow their initially intended complete integration strategy. 
Furthermore, our second proposition, saying that misalignment between the IT carve-out strategy and IT 
integration strategy leads to suboptimal IT transactions, is supported. The case has shown that for both 
parties project complexity and resource commitment were increased due to redundant activities, project 
escalation and claims. This can be traced back to misaligned transaction strategies as both parties’ 
transaction strategies did not match.  This eventually impeded higher overall costs than actually 
necessary. 
Addressing suboptimization and misaligned transaction strategies 
The case analyzed above reports a suboptimal IT transaction process from both the acquiring and 
divesting organizations’ perspectives. One reason for this was the failure to recognize the mutual 
dependencies and, consequently, the mutual influences of IT carve-out and integration strategies. This 
was the case during the planning of the transaction, as indicated by the absence of IT conditions in the 
transaction contract.  
A relevant question is: Would including IT-based clauses in the transaction contract have helped to solve 
this problem, or are other mechanisms required? To understand this, we take a second look at the 
contract and its consequences. A more extensive contract would not have resolved the fact that the seller 
and acquirer had preferences for different IT transaction processes. Nevertheless, it could potentially have 
ensured that a) the IT carve-out work did not need to be re-done, and b) regulated the additional cost 
associated with the compromise in the transaction process. In the case above, this very substantive cost 
was not considered when finalizing the deal. As presented above, this was also a key learning for 
OldTech’s carve-out practice. 
However, contracts regulating IT projects have major limitations and are typically incomplete (Richmond 
and Seidmann 1992; Sakthivel 2007). Consider the IT transaction as a joint, time-limited venture, where 
costs for carve-out and integration are allocated to the temporary transition organization. Then, there are 
lessons to be learned from experiences with joint ventures. In joint ventures, the shared sovereign and 
incomplete contracting are known obstacles that need careful attention for assuring transaction success. 
We speculate that the co-optetition relationship in IT transactions needs the same careful considerations 
in order to firstly reduce suboptimization in the process, and, secondly, to ensure that compromises to the 
optimal path are recognized when finalizing the deal. Here, the analytical framework presented in figure 6 
might help to become aware of competing objectives and alignment issues at an early stage to sufficiently 
negotiate about them. 
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Implications for theory 
This paper makes two theoretical contributions to the area of post-acquisition IT integration. First, it 
models the IT transaction as the combined action of IT carve-out and IT integration. Drawing on the 
derived dependencies between IT carve-out and integration strategies, a case study illustrates the mutual 
influence between the two strategies and their effects on the combined IT transaction process. Second, we 
develop a transaction alignment model that explains the mutual influence between IT carve-out and 
integration strategies. This paper is to our knowledge the first to analyze transactions from an integrated 
buyer-seller IT alignment perspective. 
The study presented in this paper suggests that, as indicated by previous research (Böhm et al. 2010; 
Henningsson and Carlsson 2011), there exist inter-dependencies between the IT carve-out and integration 
strategies that can increase complexity and costs associated with transferring a business unit from one 
organization to another. The explanation from an IT alignment perspective is that for meeting the 
respective corporate and SBU business strategies, the organizations participating in the transfer have 
assigned their IT capabilities differently. Not considering this asymmetry in their IT corporate strategies 
and proactively dealing with the problem caused tension between acquirer and seller. This lead to a 
suboptimal IT transaction process. 
Implications for practice 
The findings enable practitioners to better understand the link between the IT transaction and value 
creation in organizational transactions. For organizations involved in divestments and acquisitions, 
understanding the strategic configurations of business and IT capabilities that lead to symmetry or 
asymmetry in the IT transaction process provides help in two areas. One is that it identifies those SBUs 
that would be either easy or difficult to integrate for the potential acquirer. Rather than accept the high 
integration cost of business unit acquisitions that do not satisfy the conditions for alignment developed 
above, acquirers’ may find other targets or develop other growth strategies.  
The other area in which this paper provides help is to identify the challenges to be overcome when a 
potentially problematic transaction occurs. Asymmetry in a preferred transaction process should be 
considered and addressed prior to signing the transaction deal. The integrated buyer-seller alignment 
perspective helps practitioners to identify interdependencies between the seller and the buyer regarding 
their underlying corporate, IT portfolio and transaction strategies. 
Limitations and future research 
One limitation of this analysis is its restriction to the transaction of a business unit by a multi-business 
organization. It does not include the acquisition of a multi-business organization by another multi-
business organization, or the merger between two such organizations. Both are much more complex 
events than the acquisition of a business unit that is analyzed in this exploratory research study. However, 
these forms of acquisitions include a large proportion of the merger and acquisition market. 
Another limitation is the restriction to a single case study. However, as qualitative research does not 
follow induction logic, the number of cases is irrelevant. Instead it is more important to choose good cases 
for theory development or falsification. The case selected was chosen purposefully to highlight challenges 
arising from the asymmetry in the parties’ preferences for IT transaction processes, leading to major 
challenges. However, our third proposition, saying that IT transaction success is improved by aligning IT 
carve-out and integration strategies is not yet directly supported. To close this gap, subsequent research 
should address the research question with another extreme case of a particularly successful case to show 
the influence of symmetry. 
 
Organization Theory, Strategy and Information Systems 
18 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
References 
Böhm, M., Nominacher, B., Fähling, J., Leimeister, J.M., Yetton, P., and Krcmar, H. 2010. "It Challenges in M&a 
Transactions - the It Carve-out View on Divestments " in: International Conference on Information 
Systems. St Louis, Mo. 
Broyd, R., and Storch, B. 2006. "Carve to Measure," in Handbuch Mergers & Acquisitions Management, B.W. 
Wirtz (ed.). Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 1223-1237. 
Buchta, D., Eul, M., and Schulte-Croonenberg, H. 2010. Strategic It-Management: Increase Value, Control 
Performance, Reduce Costs, (3rd ed.). Wiesbaden, Germany: Gabler. 
Capron, L., Dussauge, P., and Mitchell, W. 1998. "Resource Redeployment Following Horizontal Acquisitions in 
Europe and North America, 1988-1992," Strategic Management Journal (19:7), pp. 631-661. 
Cascorbi, A. 2003. Demerger-Management. Wiesbaden, Germany: Gabler. 
Chandler, A.D. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Coury, R., Wilson, A., and Weirens, J.M. 2009. "A Closer Look at Carve-Outs." 
Dalziel, M. 2008. "The Seller's Perspective on Acquisition Success: Empirical Evidence from the Communications 
Equipment Industry," Journal of Engineering and Technology Management (25:3), pp. 168-183. 
Decker, C., and Mellewigt, T. 2007. "Thirty Years after Michael E. Porter: What Do We Know About Business 
Exit," Academy of Management Perspectives (21), pp. 41-55. 
DePamphilis, D.M. 2009. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities, (5th ed.). Burlington, 
Massachusetts: Academic Press. 
Dosi, G., Teece, D.J., and Winter, S.G. 1992. "Towards a Theory of Corporate Coherence: Preliminary Remarks. ," 
in Technology and Enterprise in a Historical Perspective, G. Dosi, R. Giannetti and P.A. Toninelli (eds.). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Dowling, M.J., and McGee, J.E. 1994. "Business and Technology Strategies and New Venture Performance: A 
Study of the Telecommunications Equipment Industry," Management Science (40:12), pp. 1663-1677. 
Du, K., and Tanriverdi, H. 2010. "The Performance Effects of Transitional It Services in Corporate Spin-Offs," 
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), St. Louis, p. Paper 248. 
Eisenhardt, K. 1989. "Building Theories from Case Study Research," Academy of Management Review), pp. 532-
550. 
Evgeniou, T. 2002. "Information Integration and Information Strategies for Adaptive Enterprises," European 
Management Journal (20:5), pp. 486-494. 
Fähling, J., Böhm, M., Leimeister, J.M., Yetton, P., and Krcmar, H. 2010. "Managing the It Carve-out in a Sbu 
Divestment," Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Information Systems, Pretoria, South 
Africa. 
Fähling, J., Leimeister, J.M., Yetton, P., and Krcmar, H. 2009. "Teaching Case: Managing an It Carve out at a 
Multi-National Enterprise," in: European Conference on Information Systems. Verona, Italy. 
Ghemawat, P. 1991. Commitment - the Dynamic of Strategy. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Giacomazzi, F., Panella, C., Pernici, B., and Sansoni, M. 1997. "Information Systems Integration in Mergers and 
Acquisitions: A Normative Model," Information & Management (32), pp. 289-302. 
Graebner, M.E., Eisenhardt, K.M., and Roundy, P.T. 2010. "Success and Failure in Technology Acquisitions: 
Lessons for Buyers and Sellers," The Academy of Management Perspectives (24:3), pp. 73-92. 
Grant, R.M. 2002. Contemporary Strategic Analysis. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Grant, R.M. 2005. Contemporary Strategic Analysis, (5 ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Haspeslagh, C., and Jemison, B. 1991. Managing Acquisitions. Creating Value through Corporate Renewal. New 
York, Ny: The Free Press. 
Henderson, J.C., and Venkatraman, N. 1993. "Strategic Alignment: Leveraging Information Technology for 
Transforming Organizations," IBM Systems Journal (32:1), pp. 4-16. 
Henningsson, S., and Carlsson, S. 2011. "The Dysiim Model for Managing Is Integration in Mergers and 
Acquisitions," Information Systems Journal (21:5), pp. 441-476. 
Hirschheim, R., and Sabherwal, R. 2001. "Detours in the Path toward Strategic Information Systems Alignment," 
California Management Review (44:1), pp. 87-109. 
Johnston, K.D., and Yetton, P.W. 1996. "Integrating Information Technology Divisions in a Bank Merger Fit, 
Compatibility and Models of Change," The Journal of Strategic Information Systems (5:3), pp. 189-211. 
 Böhm et al. / Dual View on IT Challenges in Divestments and Acquisitions 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 19 
Lajoux, A.R. 2006. The Art of M&a Integration: A Guide to Merging Resources, Processes, and Responsibilities. 
McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Leimeister, S., Leimeister, J.M., Fähling, J., and Krcmar, H. 2008. "Exploring Success Factors for It Carve out 
Projects," in: European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). Galway, Ireland. 
Mayring, P. 2008. Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen Und Techniken, (10th ed.). Weinheim, Germany: Beltz. 
Mehta, M., and Hirschheim, R. 2007. "Strategic Alignment in Mergers & Acquisitions: Theorizing Is Integration 
Decision Making," Journal of the Association for Information Systems (8:3), March 2007, pp. 143-174. 
Michaely, R., and Shaw, W.H. 1995. "The Choice of Going Public: Spin-Offs Vs. Carve-Outs," Financial 
Management (24), pp. 5-21. 
Müller, H. 2006. "Einführung Zum Mergers & Acquisitions Management," in Handbuch Mergers & Acquisitions 
Management, B.W. Wirtz (ed.). Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 1187-1207. 
Pearce, R.J. 1997. "Toward Understanding Joint Venture Performance and Survival: A Bargaining and Influence 
Approach to Transaction Cost Theory," The Academy of Management Review (22:1), pp. 203-225. 
Peteraf, M. 1993. "The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based View," Strategic Management 
Journal (14:3), pp. 179-191. 
Porter, M.E. 1991. "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy," Strategic Management Journal (12), pp. 95-117. 
Reynolds, P., Thorogood, A., and Yetton, P. 2010. "Allocation of It Decision Rights in Multibusiness Organizations: 
What Decisisions, Who Makes Them, and When Are They Taken?," International Conference on 
Information Systems (ICIS), p. Paper 169. 
Richmond, W.B., and Seidmann, A.B. 1992. "Incomplete Contracting Issues in Information Systems Development 
Outsourcing* 1," Decision Support Systems (8:5), pp. 459-477. 
Sakthivel, S. 2007. "Managing Risk in Offshore Systems Development," Communications of the ACM (50:4), pp. 
69-75. 
Seung Ho, P., and Michael, V.R. 1996. "When Competition Eclipses Cooperation: An Event History Analysis of 
Joint Venture Failure," Management Science (42:6), pp. 875-890. 
Sudarsanam, P.S. 2003. Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions: The Challenges: An Integrated and 
International Perspective. Prentice Hall. 
Tanriverdi, H., and Uysal, V.B. 2011. "Cross-Business Information Technology Integration and Acquirer Value 
Creation in Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions," Information Systems Research (22:4). 
Taub, S. 2006. "The Rise of the Carve-Out," in: The Deal LLC. 
Teece, D., and Pisano, G. 1994. "The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction," Industrial and corporate 
change (3:3), p. 537. 
Walley, K. 2007. "Coopetition: An Introduction to the Subject and an Agenda for Research," International Studies 
of Management and Organization (37:2), pp. 11-31. 
Wijnhoven, F., Spil, T., Stegwee, R., and Fa, R.T.A. 2006. "Post-Merger It Integration Strategies: An It Alignment 
Perspective," The Journal of Strategic Information Systems (15:1), pp. 5-28. 
Williamson, O.E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study on the Economics of 
Internal Organization. New York: Free Press. 
Yin, R.K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
 
 
